Realism in Metaphysics

National Research University

Higher School of Economics

  Department of Philosophy

Course Description (Program)

Realism in Metaphysics

For Masters (Philosophical Anthropology)

Author: Tatiana Levina

Moscow, 2012

Third Module

Syllabus

Realism in Metaphysics

Spring 2012

Tatiana Levina, CandSci, Senior Lecturer

*****@***ru

Course description

Course on “Realism in Metaphysics” is devoted to realist strategies in recent debates on metaphysics (). Our general question will be “why realism is developing today”, after many decades of nominalism and post-positivism? Indeed, there was serious necessity in Analytic Metaphysics in other, than nominalism, methods.

The target of the course is to understand, how realist metaphysicians see the “Reality” and what do they mean by this term. Through several metaphysical conceptions we will investigate the aim of this realist methodology and will make an answer if it is effective in Metaphysics. Is it possible to apply this methodology in other arts and sciences? We will answer on this question too.

Realism in today’s Metaphysics is strongly connected with classical metaphysics. It is important, that this classical meanings are returning after the decades of rejection of realism in post-structuralism and post-positivism in Europe and Analytic Philosophy in anglo-american world.

The main topics are:

1. Realism today ()

2. Fundamentals

3. Powers

4. Ontology of Artifacts

5. Neo-Fregeanism on Reality

Grading

50% Class Participation

20% Essay

30% Final Examination

Required Texts:

Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology / David J. Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.),. Oxford University Press (2009)

Metaphysics: An Anthology // Kim J., Sosa E. (eds.), Blackwell Publishing, (1999).

The goal of current course

Contemporary problems of philosophy: what is the main problem?

Metaphysics is not specializing, it’s a research

Why be interested in Metaphysics? New trends!

1. Realist Metaphysics

The question of the nature and plausibility of realism arises with respect to a large number of subject matters, including ethics, aesthetics, causation, modality, science, mathematics, semantics, and the everyday world of macroscopic material objects and their properties. Although it would be possible to accept (or reject) realism across the board, it is more common for philosophers to be selectively realist or non-realist about various topics: thus it would be perfectly possible to be a realist about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties, but a non-realist about aesthetic and moral value. In addition, it is misleading to think that there is a straightforward and clear-cut choice between being a realist and a non-realist about a particular subject matter. It is rather the case that one can be more-or-less realist about a particular subject matter. Also, there are many different forms that realism and non-realism can take.

The question of the nature and plausibility of realism is so controversial that no brief account of it will satisfy all those with a stake in the debates between realists and non-realists. This article offers a broad brush characterisation of realism, and then fills out some of the detail by looking at a few canonical examples of opposition to realism. The discussion of forms of opposition to realism is far from exhaustive and is designed only to illustrate a few paradigm examples of the form such opposition can take.

There are two general aspects to realism, illustrated by looking at realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties. First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table's being square, the rock's being made of granite, and the moon's being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter. Likewise, although there is a clear sense in which the table's being square is dependent on us (it was designed and constructed by human beings after all), this is not the type of dependence that the realist wishes to deny. The realist wishes to claim that apart from the mundane sort of empirical dependence of objects and their properties familiar to us from everyday life, there is no further sense in which everyday objects and their properties can be said to be dependent on anyone's linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, or whatever.

Non-realism can take many forms, depending on whether or not it is the existence or independence dimension of realism that is questioned or rejected. The forms of non-realism can vary dramatically from subject-matter to subject-matter, but error-theories, non-cognitivism, instrumentalism, nominalism, certain styles of reductionism, and eliminativism typically reject realism by rejecting the existence dimension, while idealism, subjectivism, and anti-realism typically concede the existence dimension but reject the independence dimension. Philosophers who subscribe to quietism deny that there can be such a thing as substantial metaphysical debate between realists and their non-realist opponents (because they either deny that there are substantial questions about existence or deny that there are substantial questions about independence).

2. Fundamentals

"There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. (...) Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes. " Aristotle. Metaphysics. Book 4.

"How is metaphysics, as science, possible?" Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason

“To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable. In terms of categories of traditional grammar, this amounts roughly to saying that to be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun.” W. V.Quine. On what there is

What is metametaphysics? (David Manley. Introduction to Metametaphysics (2009))

Metametaphysics is concerned with the foundations of metaphysics.¹ It asks: Do the questions of metaphysics really have answers? If so, are these answers substantive or just a matter of how we use words? And what is the best procedure for arriving at them —common sense? Conceptual analysis? Or assessing competing hypotheses with quasi-scientific criteria?

Critique of Mainstream

Deflationary theory of truth

Verbal disputes

Common sense, trivial examples

Restricted (!) quantifier

Ontological commitments

On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is. Metaphysics so conceived is concerned with such questions as whether properties exist, whether meanings exist, and whether numbers exist. I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what. Metaphysics so revived does not bother asking whether properties, meanings, and numbers exist. Of course they do! The question is whether or not they are fundamental.

Jonathan Shaffer. On what grounds that

So, the less popular version of esoteric metaphysics takes the special notions to be of what is ULTIMATELY or METAPHYSICALLY or FUNDAMENTALLY the case. The more popular version takes some notion of metaphysical priority as basic. Such a notion will hold that certain things or facts are more BASIC or more FUNDAMENTAL or PRIOR in a metaphysical sense than others. [Fine, 2001].

Ontology is concerned with questions that are expressed in perfectly ordinary terms, accessible to all.

[Still traditional way of thinking]

A Domain for Ontology

If internalism about talk about propositions is true then ‘the proposition that snow is white’ as well as ‘that snow is white’ are non-referential phrases. They do not aim to refer or denote, and thus whatever there might be, none of it is the proposition that snow is white. Similarly for properties. Thus internalism settles the external, ontological questions. It doesn’t imply anything about how many things there are, whether they are abstract or concrete, etc. But it guarantees that whatever things there may be, none of them are numbers, properties, or propositions.

Ways of Being

On McDaniel’s Heideggerian view, these assertions of priority are all reversed. The various restricted senses are semantically primitive, while the generic unrestricted sense is defined in terms of them. Moreover, the restricted senses are entirely natural and fundamental: they correspond to the true ‘logical joints’, whereas the unrestricted quantifier does not.

Platonism

Numbers as abstract objects (Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, Kit Fine)

Meta-language of Alfred Tarsky (remember his critique by Hilary Putnam)

Critique of Transcendent Universals by David Armstrong

Origins: Realism

Possible Worlds

Universals

Nonexistent Objects

Abstract Objects

3. Powers

The view is that dispositions are real and ineliminable properties, which can be distinguished, for instance, as being the causal powers of objects, and it is this realist line that Molnar defends. The realist line has come under constant attack from empiricist adversaries. Empiricists argue that there is just no need to invoke a separate category of powers in addition to categories such as events and their categorical (non-power) properties. If there is nothing more to the ascription of a power property than asserting the truth of a conditional, and that conditional mentions only events with their categorical properties, then power ascriptions can be reduced away into non-powers.

Realism about powers is a view that has gathered momentum in the contemporary debate. There have been a number of landmark contributions, such as Mellor (1974) and Martin (1984, 1993c, 1994). "Dispositions" of Mumford (1998) was also intended to uphold the view. Since then, Brian Ellis (2001,2002) has done a fine job in defence of realism about dispositions. Molnar worked on the present book before Ellis’s were published. Ellis uses a realism about dispositions in an attack on the whole Humean metaphysic. Only in Molnar’s Powers, however, do we get a detailed defence of the ontological status of power properties.

4.Ontology of Artifacts

A fish or a passport has the property – essentially, of being a fish or a passport. Fish and passport are primary kinds. Ontology includes not just physical particles and their sums, but also fish and passports. Moreover, everyday discourse can be taken about ordinary things not only to be largely true, but also to mean what speakers think it means. Unless there is some reason to do otherwise, what we commonly say (e. g., ‘‘It’s time to get your passport renewed,’’ or ‘‘The fish today is fresh’’) can be taken at face value. We do not systematically reinterpret ordinary discourse in unfamiliar terms, nor do we suppose that ordinary discourse is defective or inferior to some other (imagined) regimented language. Sentences about ordinary things mean what ordinary speakers think they mean, and such sentences are often true. If it is correct, then the ordinary things that we commonly talk about are irreducibly real, and a complete inventory of what exists will have to include persons, artifacts, artworks, and other medium-sized objects along with physical particles.

Let us make two terminological points.

(a) we shall use the term ‘‘irreducibly real’’ and its variants to refer to objects that belong in ontology: objects that exist and are not reducible to anything ‘‘else.’’ So, in this usage, someone who says, ‘‘Sure, there are tables, but a table is just a bunch of particles,’’ takes tables to be reducible to particles and hence takes particles, but not tables, to be irreducibly real. A complete ontology – comprising everything that is irreducibly real – on this view will include manifest objects like tables.

(b) We shall use the term ‘‘the everyday world’’ and its variants as labels for the target of my investigation. The everyday world is populated by all the things that we talk about, encounter, and interact with: inanimate objects, other people, activities, processes, and so on. It is the world that we live and die in, the world where our plans succeed or fail, the world we do or do not find love and happiness in – in short, the world that matters to us. This aim, again, is to give an ontological account of the shared world that we encounter and to argue that a complete inventory of all the objects that (ever) exist must mention the medium-sized objects that we are familiar with: manifest objects of the everyday world belong to irreducible reality.

5. The Neo-Fregean Programme

There are two main ingredients in Frege's philosophy of mathematics—or more exactly, in his philosophy of Arithmetic (in his sense of 'Arithmetic', in which it covers both elementary number theory and analysis). These are (i) his thesis—in virtue of which he is rightly held to have subscribed to a form of platonism in mathematics—that Arithmetic is a body of truths about independently existing objects (selbständige Gegenstände)1 —the (finite) cardinal numbers and the real numbers and (ii) his thesis in virtue of which he is rightly seen as having defended a form of logicism—that the truths of Arithmetic are analytic, by which he meant that they are all provable on the basis of general logical laws together with suitable definitions (cf. Grundlagen § 3). These two theses come together in the doctrine, to which Frege adhered for most of his philosophical career, that numbers are 'logical objects'. The doctrine may appear somewhat opaque, but it is no more than the inevitable consequence of combining theses (i) and (ii): briefly, if Arithmetic comprises theories about objects of certain kinds—the natural and real numbers—then, if its truths are to be analytic in Frege's sense, the existence of those objects must be provable on the basis, solely, of general logical laws plus definitions; in that sense at least, numbers cannot but be logical objects, i. e. objects a knowledge of which calls for nothing beyond knowledge of logic and definitions.

The central thesis of neo-Fregeanism is that, whilst Frege's own attempt to furnish a logicist-platonist foundation for Arithmetic culminated in aporia, he was nevertheless substantially right in both components of his view. Where neo-Fregeanism principally differs from Frege is in its taking a more optimistic view than Frege himself came to hold of the prospects for the kind of contextual explanation of the fundamental concepts of arithmetic and analysis—the concepts of cardinal number and real number—which he considered and rejected in the central sections (§ § 60-8) of Grundlagen.

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Sample essays

Essay 1. “Referring to non existing objects” by T. Parsons: new view or stepping on rakes.

In the dialogue "Sophist", discussing the opportunities of lie in the suggestion in light of the dialectic of the five major categories, Plato says: “Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse”.[1] Thus, the true sentence is nothing more than a statement about the existence (or maybe it is better to say – the statement of being), while the false sentence – is the negation of being, a statement of non-existence. In this sense, Plato's argument goes beyond logic: it has an appeal to ontology. This confusion of ontology and logic, without explanation, is undoubtedly one of the weaknesses of Plato's philosophy. A. F. Losev, for example, wrote a lot about it in his commentary. Nevertheless, this confusion has allowed Plato to overcome a number of problems typical for the modern philosophy. For example, the problem of references to non-existing objects. In the XX century under the powerful influence of the philosophies of Bertrand Russell and Willard Quine, talks about "the existence of" non-existent objects were virtually banned. Alexius Meinong – “perhaps the most infamous believer in nonexistent objects”[2] – was unheeded. Nevertheless, in 1979, Terence Parsons in his article “Referring to Nonexistent Objects”[3] tried to actualize Meinong’s discourse. «The theory to be sketched here was inspired by him, though I think there are ways in which it diverges from his views».[4]

From my point of view, we can summarize the main point of Parsons’ article, in two arguments: the argument for common sense and the argument to the extranuclear predicates. I should notice that these are two general philosophical or rather, speculative arguments. In this regard, part of the article where the author clarifies his position with the logic of predicates, we will not touch (though it can be considered as the third argument - the argument to the predicate logic).

Now we should consider the argument for common sense. Parsnons offers to appeal to ordinary language or, more precisely, to the ordinary language situation. He shows that there is a fundamental difference between the fail reference and the reference to a nonexistent object. Fail reference, typically involves non-recognition of reference’s object as existing. Meanwhile, a reference to a nonexistent object assumes that the object has a certain mode of existence; it is exist in some sense. The tradition of analytical philosophy of the XX century, says that in order to show the falseness of such a references is necessary to paraphrase the sentence. Thus, we can «eliminate the apparent reference to an unreal object».[5] Nevertheless, this approach is unacceptable for Parsons. Appeal to the situations of ordinary language, and the common sense tells us that the “procedure of paraphrase” is the philosophical (metaphysical) construct, empty in essence. «Nobody knows how to produce the paraphrases. It hasn't been done. None of you know how to do it either. So here's the situation: speakers of English act as if they sometimes refer to nonexistent objects. We either have to take this at face value or explain it away. Nobody knows how to explain it away».[6]

Now we can consider the argument to the extranuclear predicates. Parsons writes that we can describe any object with the set of properties, a list of nuclear predicates. Moreover, we works here with two principles: (a) any two objects can not have one set of nuclear properties and (b) for any list of nuclear properties, we can find a particular object that has just such a set of properties and nothing more. The main problem is that the “existence” of non-existent objects seen as a nuclear property (in Russell’s and Quine’s tradition). Parsons is trying to prove that it is the extranuclear predicate. He offers a list of extranuclear predicates: Ontological: "exists", "is mythical", "is fictional"; Modal: "is possible", "is impossible"; Intentional: "is thought about by Meinong", is worshipped by someone "; Technical: "is complete".[7] Thus, according to Parsons, a reference to any non-existent object is possible, because it is a reference to a specific set of properties, but not to the extranuclear predicate of existence.

Thus, it appears that non-existent objects do exist, but in particular non-extranuclear sense. Such a solution seems intuitively correct. However, there arises a number of problems. Firstly, in Parsons, as well as in Plato, the boundary between the logical and ontological erased without sufficient justification, as I think. Secondly, we must not forget that the intuitive feeling of rightness is not enough for philosophy. As I said above, according to Parsons, the non-existing objects exist in a certain sense. However, the question about the "ontological status" of these objects remains open. What does it mean to be not as a part of being, but as a list of properties and is it really can perceived as “existence” – is a problem which haven’t find a solution in Parsons’ article.

Literature.

  Parsons T. Referring to Nonexistent Objects // Theory and Decision, 1979, № 11. Pp. 95-110.

  Plato. Sophist // Perseus [electronic source]: collection of Greek texts. URL: http://www. perseus. tufts. edu/hopper/text? doc=Perseus%3atext%3a1999.01.0172%3atext%3dSoph.

Essay 2 Hofweber: From neo-Carnapian Methodology to Metaphysics

In the article “Ambitious, yet modest, metaphysics” Thomas Hofweber tries to determine a special domain of metaphysics. In addition he proposes the way to ensure a progress of a further investigation in this direction.

Metaphysics, one of the oldest philosophical disciplines at the beginning of XX century was ruled out from philosophical discourse as meaningless and based on language mistakes, the questions usually considered as proper to metaphysics were supposed to be answered by the sciences like physics or rejected as nonsense. The methods (like analysis of ordinary or scientific language) aimed to discredit specific metaphysical questions, showed in the end that neither experimental sciences, nor linguistics can rule out the problems that the metaphysics aspires to resolve.

The most important of these problems are ontological ones, in which Hofweber singles out the questions of being (or existence) of:

  Numbers (Are there numbers?);

  Properties (Are there properties?);

  Propositions (Are there propositions?).

Thus, he outlines a special metaphysical domain of philosophical investigation and makes an attempt to find out a plausible methodology to develop a new metaphysical theory and correct the old mistakes.

For this purpose he uses Carnap’s distinction between external and internal questions on a mode of existence of abstract objects: “Carnap’s internal-external distinction about what there is is usually taken to be anti-metaphysical and part of an attempt to show that traditional discipline of ontology is based on a mistake. This is, of course, correct for the historical Carnap. But as an assessment about the subject matter, I think it is mistaken”[8]. That’s why he denies that the “external questions” (like are there numbers? outside the mathematical discourse) are meaningless.

The difference between external and internal reading of metaphysical statements is based on different contribution of truth conditions of quantifiers. In ordinary communication we suppose that the utterances we use refer or correspond to “reality”. So, external method of questioning is based on intuition that every statement which is meaningful and true must be corresponded to an “entity”, and thus, there is a special domain of entities to which the metaphysical statements refer to[9]. According to this approach all numbers, properties and propositions are entities and external questions are questions about substance, i. e. ontological ones. Internal questions, contrariwise, do not suppose any reference: their truth conditions belong to a language and have no relation with any external entities. Thus, they can’t show the nature of objects like numbers, properties and propositions, because they are the questions about language and not about substance.

Are there numbers?

Ordinary language	Metaphysical counterpart
Jupiter has four moons.	The number of moons of Jupiter is four.
Internalism	Externalism
There are numbers	There are such entities like numbers
(by inference)	(by reference)
The answer: No	The answer: Yes
(metaphysical domain)	(scientific domain)

Hofweber’s conclusion for methodology of metaphysics is as follows: “There is no distinct metaphysical method to address the ontological questions. To find the answer we have to decide between internalism and externalism, which is done with the methods employed in the study of language, and related issues”[10]. So, he bases his own metaphysical project on application of these two methods and investigation whether the objects like numbers, properties and propositions are entities or not. The final question about the consequences remains, from my point of view, unanswered.

Essay 3 “Some critical remarks concerning the article “Universals as Attributes” by D. M. Armstrong”

The ontological discussions in analytical philosophy have been detailled so deeply, that now someone can proclaim himself a Nominalist, but a Realist of properties and relations. Such approach may cause different and even puzzling questions from European historian of philosophy. How can absolutely unlike positions be manifested at one time and not in a controversial way. Secondly, using the Wittgenstein’s “state of affair” notion to speak about universals seems also very promiscuous. And at last but not least: if universal is just a way the things appear, or they stand to each other, which additional scores it makes to realistic point of view than to nominalistic one, because if it does not, then why we should even mention it at all? These are the main arguable points in D. M. Armstrong very interesting article about universals, and I will attempt to show weakness and unobviosness of his several arguments, which rely upon quite obscure term “instantiation”.

In the first chapter of his “Universals as attributes” Armstrong (after the scholasts) discerns three possible ontological positions concerning universals: universalia ante res (“universals before things”), universalia in rebus (“universals in things”) and universalia post res (“universals after things”). First of these positions is called Platonic view and is abandoned immediately due to separate realm of Forms, which genuine philosophical status still remains unclear. However, Armstrong consider Plato and his followers as the main rivals, criticising them from different sides, though he does not clarify his own point of view; the rejection of uninstantiated universals makes his views close to Aristotle. If that is so, his position occurs to be exactly between realistic and nominalistic doctrines what permits him call himself Realist and Nominalist at the same time. But from the history of philosophy’ view such approach seems rather surprising and certainly compels philosophers to take part in the additional debates.

Armstrong doesn’t confine himself to using just particulars and universals in order to describe the world. He applies the notion of “state of affairs” and, as far as it seems, this notion becomes very significant in his theory. One might say that states of affairs are the primary constituents of the world than particulars as it seemed before. States of affairs do really exist; they can’t be reduced to their own constitents (such as particulars and universals) because they correspond something more than simple sum of their parts. Apparently Armstrong tries to reconcile Wttgenstein’s and Russel’s theories, whereas his understanding of universals’ ontology is quite different than Russel’s approach. Armstrong considers states of affairs as particulars having such and such universals (thick particulars), what makes one ask a logical question: why do we need to double our ontology by means of state of affairs and what explanatory value do we gain from such theory? As it was mentioned before, Armstrong regards the existence of particulars before the existence of universals (what makes him a Nominalist in his sense), but then he turns attention to state of affairs, thinking that they are the first “thing” we meet in the world. But what kind of connection between states of affairs and their constituents and is there any signs of causality between them, - such questions remain unclear.

Thinking of universals as the terms of ways does not give any profit to realistic or nominalistic point of view, as it is admitted by Armstrong himself. So such explanation must be nothing but a metaphor, and still it shows some weakness in the foundation of the theory. I speak about “instantiation”. This term is a matter of principle and plays central role in his doctrine. However, I could’t find a place where this term is somehow explained. The crude sketch of argumentation provides two different interpretations of “instantiation”. First is realistic one; but if we consider the instantiation as universal, it’ll immediately entail the old problem of “third person”. But we might say that instantiation is not a universal; then there will be a property (or relation) which is not universal, but that is contradictory with all our theory. That’s why the instantiation is not either a property or a relation and the nature of this notion doesn’t have clear explanation.

To sum up, the rising interest to ancient and medieval philosophy in analytical academic societies permits us to notice a remarkable tendency: the Anglo-American philosophers are involving into the history of philosophy, which is so influential in continental Europe. That makes the philosophical ties much stronger between these different positions. Moreover, analytical approach doesn’t just repeat the old arguments; it tries to detail and specify various sides of such philosophical views, which have been remained unchangeable in Europe for so long. I guess it points out the very life of philosophy, not leaving it behind in the dust.

[1] Plato. Sophist. 163d

[2] Parsons T. Referring to Nonexistent Objects // Theory and Decision, 1979, № 11. P. 98

[3] Parsons T. Referring to Nonexistent Objects // Theory and Decision, 1979, № 11. Pp. 95-110.

[4] Parsons T. Referring to Nonexistent Objects // Theory and Decision, 1979, № 11. P. 98

[5] Parsons T. Referring to Nonexistent Objects // Theory and Decision, 1979, № 11. P. 97

[6] Ibid

[7] Parsons T. Referring to Nonexistent Objects // Theory and Decision, 1979, № 11. P. 102

[8] Hofweber Th. A pazzle about ontology. Noûs, 39:2, 2005. P. 277.

[9] Hofweber does not narrow down a specific type of this reference.

[10] Hofweber Th. Ambitious, yet modest, metaphysics. Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford, 2009. P. 287.