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Основные модели, разобранные в курсе[1]

1.  Acemoglu, D. Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics. Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 31, No.4, 2003, pp. 620-652.

2.  Acemoglu D., Robinson J. Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective. American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 1, 2006, pp. 115-131.

3.  Acemoglu D., Robinson J. Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 4, 2000, pp. .

4.  Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. A.Robinson. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 4, 2002, pp. .

5.  Aghion Ph., Alesina A., Trebbi F. Endogenous Political Institutions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 2, 2004, pp. 565-611.

6.  Blanchard O., Kremer M. Disorganization. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 4, 1997, pp. .

7.  Djankov S., Glaeser E., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A. The New Comparative Economics, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2003, pp. 595-619.

8.  Eaton B., White W. The Distribution of Wealth and the Efficiency of Institutions. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1991, pp. 336-350.

9.  Glaeser E., Shleifer A. Legal Origins. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol., 107, No. 4, 2002, pp. .

10.  Glaeser E., Shleifer A. The Rise of the Regulatory State. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2003, pp. 401-425.

11.  Lizzeri A., Perisco N. Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain’s “Age of Reform”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 2, 2004, pp. 707-765.

12.  McGuire M., Olson M. The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1996, pp. 72-96.

13.  Murphy K., Shleifer A., Vishny R. Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth? American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, 1993, pp. 409-414.

14.  Status Quo Bias (материалы лекций)

15.  Причины установления высоких барьеров (материалы лекций)

16.  Теоретико-игровая модель финансирования реформы (материалы семинаров и Fudenberg D., Tirole J. Game Theory. MIT Press, 2000, pp.211-213, 333-336)

[1] Данный список дает представление об основных моделях, которые должны быть усвоены.