Ramada Park Hotel, Geneva

‘Versoix II’

Ramada Park Hotel, Geneva

Sunday, 12 January – Monday, 13 January 2003

AIMS

1.  To review and assess, in detail, current levels of preparedness in and around Iraq.

2.  To highlight any revisions that may need to be made to current contingency response; and

3.  To identify areas for immediate action.

INTRODUCTION

·  Need agreement on common planning figures

·  Further guidance on the issue of the potential use of Nuclear Chemical and Biological (NBC) weapons

·  Guidance on interaction with the media and a PI strategy developed.

·  There is a need to look with greater detail of the impact on countries surrounding Iraq in the event of conflict.

·  Although this is the first phase of the emergency, recovery should not be ignored.

·  What are the legal considerations for humanitarian operations in Iraq given the sanctions?

·  Further discussion relating to trans-border and cross-border assistance.

·  Guidelines on interaction with the military.

INTER-AGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING PROCESS

·  Contingency planning is now taking the form of the integrated humanitarian contingency plan for Iraq and neighbouring countries (shared prior to, and during, the meeting). The draft is to be presented to the DSG Steering Group on Iraq, 17 January 2003 and any additional comments must be made before then.

IRAQ

·  Outlined the humanitarian environment in Iraq:

o  The Oil for Food Programme (OFFP) equates to 500,000MT food/month.

o  More than 25 million Iraqis are dependent on food aid

o  Levels of anaemia among pregnant and lactating women, and child malnutrition rates are high (4% of under fives suffer severe malnutrition).

o  The breakdown of OFFP will have a catastrophic effect.

o  Iraq can be divided into North, Central and Southern Regions and Baghdad.

o  In the north the challenge will be the delivery of fuel and medical supplies.

o  The centre is expected to be focus of resistance and to sustain the most damaged in a conflict. The majority of the 2 million displaced are likely to be from here.

o  The south is the poorest part of Iraq with the worst water supply. Resistance and damage is expected.

·  Discussion took place regarding nomination of a Regional Humanitarian Co-ordinator (RHC) and the extent to which regional co-ordination would add to or duplicate existing co-ordination mechanisms based on the Resident Co-ordinator (RC) system.

·  It was agreed that any establishment of a RHC office in Cyprus should be temporary with the Iraq UNCT. A phased return to secure areas in Iraq should be considered.

·  The poor communication systems in Iraq were highlighted and security implications noted.

·  In the event of a conflict, it should be noted that revenue for UN agencies will no longer come from oil sales. It will only come from activities in three northern governorates. There are concerns that Kurdish authorities may not be happy if revenues are shared with the rest of Iraq.

·  The fact that current security UN measures mean that ICRC may be the only organisation remaining in Iraq to provide assistance to beneficiaries and asylum seekers located in border areas was highlighted.

·  UNOPS have a mine action programme in northern Iraq.

·  The Office of the HC requires additional staff for 2003 with the following expertise:

1.  NGO liaison

2.  Contingency planning

3.  IDP issues

4.  Humanitarian co-ordination

REGIONAL REVIEWS (REGIONAL DIRECTORS)

·  UNHCR informed that Mr. Lubbers will send a letter to neighbouring countries underlining their responsibilities in temporary asylum seekers and refugees.

·  The principal of non-refoulement will be put to the governments of Iraq’s neighbours.

·  UNHCR requests that country border positions not be published in public documents

·  WFP costing estimations need to be revised to consider inflated fuel costs in the case of war. Real costs will be much higher.

·  The need for a common UN strategy for fuel supply to Iraq was raised. (JLC TO FOLLOW UP)

·  UN must begin considering what assets it may require if the OFFP is dissolved. (OCHA TO FOLLOW UP)

UN COUNTRY TEAM UPDATES

IRAN

·  Iran has an effective humanitarian task force (TF) effective with 11 sectoral sub-groups (10 operational).

·  The contingency plan requires refinement with particular attention to trans-border issues and inflows of refugees. Clarification regarding trans-border issues and cross-border policy is necessary.

·  Funding is a concern, further interaction with the donor community is required.

·  The Government of Iran (GoIran) has given public confirmation that borders will not be closed and campsites will be located in border areas. However, Iranian armed forces are on alert in these areas leading to problems of access to border. The UNCT and TF are working closely with GoIran with regard to camps.

·  The presence of landmines in border areas is of concern. UNDP have provided mine awareness training.

·  UNCT request an FSO. (UNSECOORD TO FOLLOW UP)

·  Iranian RC society will operate under BAFIA (Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs).

·  NGOs are beginning to arrive in Iran.

·  GoIran has granted permission regarding use of radio communications.

JORDAN

·  The Government of Jordan (GoJ) has unofficially indicated that borders will be open.

·  UNCT is working with the Jordanian Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, there is some difficulty given the official and unofficial GoJ position on closed / open borders (respectively). UNHCR leads the contingency planning process. There is minimal NGO participation but the Red Cross movement is actively involved.

·  The GoJ has indicated that it is expecting more support from the UN than 10 years ago, particularly with regard to the financial costs incurred by Jordan.

·  GoJ is approaching the Japanese, EU and USA for funding next week after which UNCT will approach same donors (GoJ have requested everything is cleared through them and their plans are finalised first).

·  GoJ plan to screen refugees on arrival. There are concerns that people may be left at the borders for protracted periods. Planning is underway with GoJ for UNHCR and partners will build a camp 80km inside Jordanian territory.

·  It should be remembered that there are 300,000 Iraqis (GoJ figure) in Jordan and there is concern at their reaction to any conflict in Iraq.

·  The NGO community is growing as Jordan is perceived as a springboard to Iraq. A registration process is envisaged and UNHCR will be involved in it.

·  The Hashemite Charity will be the GoJ implementing partner.

·  Stockpiling is taking place (not all designated for Jordan, much for Iraq) to support approximately 20 – 30,000 persons.

·  The lack of water is a concern for the national population as well as any refugee population in Iraq.

·  Already considering return phase as GoJ prefer limited duration of refugees.

·  The GoJ is expecting many TCNs. They expect majority will transit Jordan and have indicated that they will require logistical support.

·  Concerns remain with regard to the implications for Palestinian Jordanians (three million) and Iraqis (300,000) if hostilities break out.

KUWAIT

·  There is a Government of Kuwait (GoK) / UNHCR working group on refugees.

·  GoK willing to provide resources to the UN in support of the Iraq response but require a consolidated request.

·  Plans are ongoing for US military created Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC), involvement of the Kuwaiti Red Crescent Society (KRCS) will not occur.

·  Currently, there are no humanitarian operations in Kuwait nor NGOs present. The main organisation is the KRCS. Small international presence, 17 in UNCT.

·  MOSS compliant for phase III with exception of some communications equipment.

SAUDI ARABIA

·  Saudi Arabia still has refugees from 1991. They prefer to keep borders closed but will open if necessary with two potential crossing points. Refugees will be housed in a new, separate camp from 1991 refugees.

·  Completion of UNCT contingency plans underway. Need work on trans-border and cross border operations that may be necessary for future.

·  UNCT work will focus on technical support to Government of Saudi Arabia (GoSA)

·  Need to work on MOSS compliance.

·  UNCT is working with Saudi Red Crescent Society but their plans unknown as yet.

·  Potential targeting of Western assets is a threat if there is a protracted conflict.

SYRIA

·  Maps are available with Government of Syria (GoS) border crossing points. GoS accept inflow of refugees but request support from international community as they do not currently have resources.

·  A state emergency committee has been established and has prepared a demographic profile of refugees. GoS working figure of 100,000 refugees (UN 20,000).

·  Syrian Red Crescent Society and Syrian Women’s Association are the main partners of GoS. There are an increasing number of bilateral missions to Syria, most recently a Japanese mission.

TURKEY

·  A UNCT / Government of Turkey (GoT) MoU has been drafted

·  The GoT does not adopt a flexible position with regards the Kurdish issue internally and in Northern Iraq.

·  GoT learnt the following lessons in 1991.

Do not want refugees stranded at the border. Borders will be open. The GoT will help refugees and those in need inside Iraq. Turkey lost $30 billion as a result of the first Gulf war. GoT will meet their responsibilities in IHL but want the international community to fund it. Internal security remains an issue.

·  UNCT has established an Inter-Agency working group: UNHCR (lead Agency), WFP, UNICEF, IOM & UNDP

·  JLC satellite to be established in Turkey.

·  Currently, GoT will not permit INGOs to operate concerning Iraq response.

·  Funding is urgently required, pre-positioning to date is minimal. Staffing deployment starting. Not prepared if conflict starts in 2-3 weeks. Stocks from earthquake response may be available but must be repaid.

·  GoT intend to control territories in Northern Iraq.

·  18 IDP campsites have been identified by GoT, 12 inside Iraq (up to 30km from the border) based on Turkish military presence in N Iraq and water supply but no other planning apparent. The exact location of camps in Northern Iraq remains unknown. Concern that camps in N Iraq may represent civilian internment.

·  UNCT Turkey, recognises the need to complement humanitarian operations with those working further inside Iraq if conflict occurs.

·  Concern about total evacuation of staff in Turkey due to Security Phase III, how it reflects on UN, ability to return and resume operations, and potential requisition of assets.

LEBANON

·  Contingency plan in collaboration with the Government of Lebanon (GoL) is advanced. Lebanon is divided into two regions, southern Lebanon – UNIFIL and the rest of the country. The contingency plan is based on outbreak of hostilities in the south and potential break down of law and order countrywide if there are a large number of casualties in Iraq and increasing tension in oPt.

·  After 11.09.01 the status of all refugees in country is being investigated. UNCT assume refugees to Lebanon will have family links or plan to use Lebanon to transit to a third country.

·  UNCT planning on 200 – 300,000 potential IDPs from southern Lebanon one third of who are likely need assistance.

·  UNRWA is the only organisation with stocks that would be available.

·  Lebanese infrastructure for humanitarian operations weak. There are a large number of Lebanese NGOs with extensive experience gained through civil war. More recently become social economic societies.

·  MOSS compliant to Phase I.

COLLABORATION WITH PARTNERS

ICRC

·  ICRC will have the lead role for the Red Cross Movement in Iraq if the country is involved in a military conflict. Essential staff will remain when UN goes to Phase V.

·  Pre-position of stocks is based on a phased response: initially 100,000 IDPs latter an additional 300,000 IDPs, targeting most vulnerable. Anticipate that IDPs will be absorbed in host families.

·  Operations will focus on prisoners of war, war wounded, IDPs within Iraq and the water and sanitation sector

·  ICRC has not contacted donors yet as they do not want to raise profile. To date CHF 16 million has been spent from reserve funds but an appeal will be launched if / when war starts.

·  Logistics are independent from JLC

IFRC

·  Will be the lead agency in countries outside Iraq.

·  Iranian Red Crescent is prepared for 50,000 people.

·  Syria and Jordan are prepared for approximately 5,000 persons

·  Kuwait stocks are in Dubai.

·  Utilised spontaneous donations, nothing left now. No appeal yet planned.

ICVA

·  Co-ordination between NGO and UN could be better. ICVA noted that NGOs prefer to co-ordinate in the field.

·  Request clarification about NGO registration in Jordan – UN led? (OCHA TO FOLLOW UP.)

SCHR

·  A reluctance of NGOs to share information with their own headquarters, SCHR and UN exists due to security concerns. No reluctance to co-operate.

·  NGOs are concerned about the lack of advocacy by UN Agencies (with the exception of UNHCR) on the human costs of a war in Iraq.

InterAction

·  Sent a letter to President Bush urging him to work towards a peaceful resolution to conflict, and if conflict is unavoidable then must adhere to IHL.

·  Assessments inside Iraq are proving difficult due to the sanctions.

·  Plan to have representation in the NGO hub when it is established in Amman.

·  InterAction member assessments and plans can be found on the website: www. interaction. org/disasters/ (scroll to member reports).

OXFAM

·  The international water and sanitation working group (UN and NGOs including OXFAM) is collaborating on Iraq response.

CROSS BORDER TRANS BORDER ISSUES

A number of issues were raised and discussed.

·  Clarification through the weekly teleconference was requested. (OCHA, UNHCR, ICRC TO FOLLOW UP)

·  Persons not able to cross border, but wishing to in order to ask for international protection / asylum – will considered UNHCR persons of concern. Persons will be screened according to 1951 convention to categorise reasons for flight. Will work with ICRC for registration. ICRC has right to have access to populations for humanitarian services and protection.

·  Will be key discussion point with national and coalition military.

·  Security implications for staff.

·  Security Council action or the UNSG must ensure host governments will allow UN to carry out transborder operations. Then the JLC will obtain the necessary agreements for transport of humanitarian cargo across borders. (UNCTs TO FOLLOW UP WITH RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS)

·  Delivery of goods across border will be necessary. UNCT where deliveries are being launched from is responsible.

SECURITY

·  Security plan has been in development for some months

·  Limitations have stemmed from the incapacity to consult widely and at various levels (political sensitivity). Nonetheless, experts were approached for information concerning NBC weapons.

·  Plan is based on Iraq plus six neighbouring countries (Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey). At least 24 countries could be directly affected by a military conflict in Iraq. It is the responsibility of the UNCT to implement the plan in the field.

·  UNSECOORD will deploy 11 Field Security Officers (FSO) and Regional FSO for the RHC. One FSO has been deployed to Kuwait and one is planned for Turkey (end January).

·  If Phase IV is declared UNSECOORD will operate a 24-hour operations room in NY.

·  FSO will be augmented significantly by UNHCR, WHO, WFP and UNICEF security officers in the field. Their plans are well developed and they have commenced deploying officers.

·  The decision to evacuate international staff would be made following presentation by the Designated Official in country. Following discussion during the meeting, UNSECOORD confirmed that Phase III would NOT be automatically implemented in previously specified countries and that the decision to do so would be made on a case by case basis in consultation with respective Designated Officials. UNSECOORD acknowledged arguments against the concurrent evacuation of Northern Iraq and undertook to review any formal counter proposal by the Designated Official.

·  Air will be the principal means of evacuation. Dependants should be evacuated to their country of home leave.

·  Local staff should be paid three-month’s salary when internationals evacuate.

·  All security related statements are to be made through the UN Security Coordinator.

·  The potential use of Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons remains of concern and an extremely sensitive subject. UN NBC policy was distributed November 2002. (NBC was further discussed during a half-day session at the end of the meeting. See below)

·  The potential for return after an evacuation (including phased return) will be assessed based on security information.

·  The marking of UN vehicles is recommended to optimise effect of agreed privileges and immunities applicable to the UN – UN written on all four sides in blue (DPKO vehicles are marked the same in black).

CO-ORDINATION

·  Co-ordination mechanisms are in place and consist of weekly teleconferences including RCs in the region, Steering group meets twice week and reports to the DSG Steering Committee, and the IASC reference group.

·  OCHA has deployed staff to all neighbouring countries except Saudi Arabia.

·  Terms of Reference for the Regional HC for Iraq were distributed to participants.

·  RC checklist was also distributed.

·  Sectoral co-ordination groups were outlined during the meeting. The following lead Agencies were identified in Iraq and were agreed to be mirrored at the HQ level:

o  IDP / Refugee Shelter - UNHCR lead, noting that HABITAT and UNOPS are already operational with shelter programmes in northern Iraq. (HC TO ADVISE ON PROGRAMMES IN N. IRAQ)

o  IDPs – HC

o  Asylum seekers UNHCR,

o  Health - WHO with UNICEF support

o  WatSan - UNICEF

o  Transport/Logistics/Food - WFP

o  Fuel – to be decided, in the meantime, JLC is looking into the issue

o  Protection – to be decided

·  Clarification was requested concerning Information flows and reporting formats and mechanisms. (OCHA TO FOLLOW UP)

·  Numbers for Cyprus:

o  UNICEF 3, UNHCR 1, UNDP 2 (+ 5 if needed), WHO 3-4, UNSECOORD 3, WFP 25 (includes support staff + JLC 6-7), HIC 1 liaison person (evacuation 5), ICT to be determined, FAO 3, (NGO, IOM, OHCHR, UNWRA, none)

TOTAL 41 – 51 (+ ICT)

INTER AGENCY SERVICES

JLC

·  First Phase in establishment completed utilising CERF money raised by WFP. A website has been created and will go live soon. Logistics information has been collected. Four staff are located in Rome (Co-ordinator, Information Manager, Aviation Specialist and Cartographer).

·  The JLC will activate at the onset of hostilities. Additional staff will be deployed to the field within 72 hours.

·  Air operations – Cargo prioritised. Currently assessments are underway for airports. Actual arrangements for transport into crisis areas will begin 20 January. RC Kuwait noted that the commercial airport will be closed with the onset of hostilities.

·  The UNJLC will try to assist agencies not to compete against each other and avoid needless price inflation.

·  The JLC offered to explore the possibility of a UN passenger service. (JLC TO FOLLOW UP)

HIC

·  Preparedness activities to date include the building a network for compatible data, setting data standards (metadata) and disseminating those standards. Training staff to conduct rapid assessments of metadata is underway in the field.

·  A virtual HIC has been established. The site is password protected and passwords should be requested from *****@***org

·  The VHIC has open and closed pages, the former including various links to media and other sources.

·  The VHIC will be further expanded to include the following information at the country level: contact lists, meeting schedules, who/what/where.

·  GIST data repository has been created through key UN agencies and donors.

·  HIC staff deployments have taken place in Cairo and are ready for Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait and Syria.

·  All HIC staff technically trained in GIS &/or databases.

·  Mapping is ongoing and there are positive developments in obtaining satellite imagery. It was noted that like data standards, there is a need to use common maps

·  It was noted that the HIC help in the provision of standardised data but not in the preparation of narrative reports – this would be assumed to remain the responsibility of HAOs.

·  The Iraq country team agreed to share sectoral information from northern Iraq where there is a UNOPS run JIHC, which has completed a gazetteer of the three northern governorates and a who/what/where database. (UNCT IRAQ AND HIC TO FOLLOW UP)

ICT

A simultaneous three day meeting was ongoing and reported back to Versoix II the following agreements:

Assessments of ICT requirements in the field have been completed by FITTEST. Each country will use resources in place already, therefore there is no single agreement for the region. The Agency in the best position to support the UNCT with ICT will be lead agency in that country. WFP remains responsible for the preparedness phase including the assessment and deployment of staff to either support the current lead agency as required or the UN Resident Representative/HC office. Despite the country by country approach, common standards (IP and common channels on voice) and complementary in communications throughout the region will be ensured. Public networks will be used but users need to keep in mind they may be compromised in event of conflict and prepare as necessary. The way in which to fund gaps in technological / personnel requirements will need to be covered by a flexible funding strategy in the absence of a Consolidated Appeal. TCOs are to be identified by the lead Agencies. A Regional TCO linked to RHC recruited by OCHA is recommended to enforce an operational system. This person should be seen as a co-ordinator rather than a technical person. Even if no RHC, a Regional TCO function remains necessary. Each UNCT should have a permanent radio room for MOSS compliance. Radio licensing needs to be completed. The current IASC-RGICT will be responsible for all regional aspects of ICT including support to the Regional TCO.

CIVIL MILITARY INTERACTION

·  The UN does not plan to use military assets.

·  US forces “do not plan to play a direct role in humanitarian assistance” unless the need or request arises. The need to clearly distinguish between US military interventions and UN humanitarian interventions was raised.

·  The Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC) in Kuwait will be established mid January by the US military within the Kuwaiti Governmentto liaise with UN agencies in the event of war focusing on logistics, unclassified military information and access routes. HOC is likely to follow ground forces into Iraq when that occurs.

·  Use of - UN guidelines exist on the use of civil defence assets humanitarian operations.

·  USAID mission in Kuwait has pre-positioned 2 million Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDR) rations. There are new HDRs – salmon in colour.

·  UNCTs were requested to provide information / co-ordinates of UN locations, including warehouses where there are UN stores, and non-UN humanitarian assets to UNSECOORD. (UNCTs TO FOLLOW UP)

·  According to military resources military targeting has improved and will not occur as it did in 1991. ICRC note that a target must be proved to be a military target and therefore the burden of proof falls on the default, anything that is not a military target is therefore civilian.

·  NGO groups are also concerned about the risk of being forced to work with military and are making clear that they are not partners of the US military and do not wish to be referred to as such.

·  ICRC noted relations with the military is also a complex issue also for Red Cross Movement and discussions ongoing. The key is to have a separation between the military and humanitarian actors not only operationally but in terms of perception. Therefore, ICRC activities will take place independently and will not be co-ordinated with any military although there can be collaboration / information sharing. The ICRC welcomes the Kuwaiti HOC as it will provide crucial information but this will not remain the case if the centre is operational.

·  Concern was raised as to perceptions of UN humanitarian operations and personnel should UN sanctioned strikes occur.

Information / Press

Special Iraq body has been established within DPI (IATF). Agency representatives to the IATF need to interact with their Agencies and ensure two-way flow of information.

·  PI has to be an integral and central part of the humanitarian effort – it shows not only UN operations but highlights the humanitarian plight of Iraqis.

·  The PI programme should be proactive and not defensive.

·  There needs to be a co-ordinated PI capability / capacity in the region. Such capacity has to be where the journalists are. DPI presence, including a Spokesperson, is therefore initially proposed in Amman, but will move as journalists move. Iraq UNCT would prefer it to be in Baghdad. DPI noted that the best policy to have as much PI capacity as possible throughout the region. The DPI base will be available to UN agencies for their use. Success rests on:

1)  inflow of information to the PI people there and

2)  guidance on crucial information beforehand and clearance of information.

·  Focus of PI should be daily inter-Agency briefings moderated by DPI – logistically quicker to target the audience together than bilaterally. Agencies can ensure a consolidated UN message and not a UN message as interpreted by CNN.

·  Information flow out of Iraq will be a challenge particularly if UN evacuate personnel.

·  National staff should not speak officially on behalf of the UN even in the event of an evacuation of international staff. Further discussion is necessary on what a national staff member should do if a microphone is thrust in their face and guidance given to them and heads of offices. This has nothing to do with the competence of national staff but does have security implications.

·  If RCs have plans for PI programmes or capacity in country please share with DPI – ACTION UNCTs.

·  Arabic language dissemination of information is recognised as important and is being addressed. Statements in Arabic and to the Arab world are important considering a somewhat negative UN image in the region. Doha and Dubai are recognised as major hubs of Arabic language media. DPI are planning a weeklong briefing of Arabic media in the region.

·  In Iran, UNHCR have an international PIO the only one in country. The Iran UNIC remains without a head and needs one urgently. (DPI TO FOLLOW UP)

·  What about crash training of all staff in the region? (DPI WILL FOLLOW UP, LIKELY TO FOCUS ON RC’S FIRST, ESPECIALLY WHERE THERE IS NO UNIC CAPACITY)

FUNDING AND RESOURCES

·  All key agencies have carried out bilateral discussions with donors. None have received pledges for support. All agencies are recommended to contact donors including ECHO. ECHO does not fund contingency planning, but do have a provision for retroactive funding.

·  Kuwait is a source of funding and the GoK has asked for a consolidated UN funding request with planning figures (not a Consolidated Appeal). OCHA TO FOLLOW UP

·  Steering Group should be approached to allow OCHA to present a consolidated resources and needs document for presentation to potential donors. This does not preclude country teams approaching donors directly.

·  The DSG willing to contact donors on behalf of Agencies. Requests need to be as specific as possible and should be sent to Oliver Ulich (OCHA, NY) for DSG.

·  There is concern about accepting money from coalition forces countries.

·  RCs request guidance on donor briefings – DPI/OCHA donor relations section to follow up?

·  An HLWG meeting is planned for 14 January as are donor missions by the ERC to Canada, The Netherlands and the UK and by the AERC to Norway.

POST CONFLICT/RECOVERY

·  It is essential to consider reconstruction and rehabilitation after Iraq conflict at this early stage, to build on humanitarian co-ordination mechanisms and be reflected in the Regional HC ToRs.

·  IASC Working Group should begin to discuss the issue now. Transitional justice systems are already being looked at.

BENEFICIARY PLANNING FIGURES

The UN will most likely be criticised whatever figures are used in terms of external perceptions. Need consistency as to whether UNCTs use upper or lower planning figures. At Versoix I the range of beneficiaries was 4.8 – 9.5 million. Now it is:

·  Iraq increased from 900,000 to 2 million with real concern that the entire population could become dependent on food aid.

·  Jordan remains the same 50,000.

·  Syria remains the same 50,000.

·  Saudi Arabia UNHCR 100,000 planning on 20,000.

·  Kuwait same 50,000 but GoK say possibly 100,000.

·  Iran doubled to 900,000 although in terms of preparation 258,000.

·  Turkey increased to 136,000 from 60,000.

Iraq:

·  600,000 projected refugee / asylum seekers (ie those at the border).

·  2 m IDPs in addition to the existing IDP caseload

·  At the border, individuals will be registered as Refugees, IDPs or TCNs. Currently, the latter are not counted as a separate accounting figure.

·  WFP believe 4.6 m people remaining in Iraq would need food and assume 600,000 will get out. Food stocks are being pre-positioned to be ready for 900,000. Note, this could cater to more beneficiaries for a short period, or fewer beneficiaries for a longer period.

·  UNCT Iraq noted that they expect the majority of IDPs to head towards Iran and lesser numbers to head towards Turkey.

VERSOIX II – CB Awareness Session, 14 January 2003

The meeting was attended by some 45 individuals; including 3 Resident Coordinators, UNDP Iraq, and HQ Security Officers from both WFP and UNHCR.

Presentations were given by:

·  Introduction to and UN Policy on NBC - Stuart Groves (OHCHR on behalf UNSECOORD)

·  Introduction to BW Threat - Dr Randall Hyer, WHO

·  Overview of OPCW Capability for CW - Hassan Mashhadi, OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), The Hague

The presentations covered a number of topic areas including: types of CBW; military strategy; protective clothing and equipment; decontamination; international conventions; OPCW assets and training capabilities; psychological impact; and potential scenarios. and a reiteration of the UN Policy vis a vis NBC as outlined in the guidance document circulated in November 2002. Session participants were very engaged, raising many questions, concerns and issues that were discussed among the experts, agencies and UNSECOORD.

UNSECOORD

·  Provided an overview of the NBC threat, specifically highlighting question of protective equipment, and elaborating on the decision to not provide such equipment to UN staff.

·  Reiterated the position of UNSG – all UN staff except those mandated to be there (ie those with proper training to work in an NBC environment, such as DPKO) to be evacuated before an attack occurs.

·  Noted that the threat of NBC usage rests on 2 issues: capability and intent. The former is assumed to exist, currently the latter has not been identified.

·  Indicated that UNSECOORD would identify areas safe for return if believed to have been impacted by CW or BW. As for other cases, will defer to experts with appropriate detection equipment and expertise to advise on safe return to contaminated or areas suspected to be contaminated. This is a workable practice used in identification of UXO and landmines after conflict.

The majority of questions focused on general and specific policy issues and guidance, (ie. what to tell staff and what practical measures can be taken if caught in an attack) and operational procedures, what if refugees arrive contaminated, how identify contaminated food stocks and what to do with them.

It was noted that the UN was reactive and not proactive on this issue. NBC weapons have been around for a long time and still there is little guidance or directives. Given this, there is a need to delink development of NBC policy from the Iraq situation and recognise even if it is never used in this conflict, there are real possibilities of it happening in the future and policy / guidance needs to be addressed.

WHO noted they would hold daily press conferences to address NBC issues in the event of a war.

OPCW has, at the request of Kuwait and Jordan, carried out training at the national level in both member states to strengthen national level CW capacity in the face of a potential threat from a conflict in Iraq. Theoretically, they could train UN personnel at HQ and in the field and have a provision to put the array of equipment and expertise available within the organisation, but could do so only if specifically requested by the SG.

IFRC has recently changed their policy regarding NBC training and are already developed training tools and will begin this/next week with training of national societies. They would want to ensure that any possible training they would provide, would be consistent to the training received by UN staff, and requested that the UN share any training guidelines and materials developed with the IFRC to ensure a consistent approach.

Overall Conclusions

·  Overall guidance provided thus far is good, but significantly more is needed, and should be developed and delivered as soon as possible.

·  There is broad-based concern by all those involved in Iraq, not least those in the field, about the potential threat of NBC attacks, and the lack of practical information and guidance on the issue.

·  Concerns need to be addressed in a consolidated manner ASAP – there is unlikely to be a V3. A ‘non-task force’ was suggested to develop and agree on necessary materials, and to ensure that everyone receives consistent/same information.

·  It was recognised that a major element of NBC is psychological and on that note the need for more information is essential to reduce panic and help individuals including managers, make informed decisions.

·  Recognition that expertise exists in the UN and donors have given positive feedback on the issue of CBW training – that constraints at the moment appear to be political not practical.

·  In this day and age, NBC should be addressed in all security plans – and that this should be delinked from Iraq.

·  The Security Steering Group needs to review this issue within the context of the latest discussions on the matter. UNSECOORD will brief the Steering Group on the results of the Versoix II CB session and identify concerns expressed by agencies and RCs.

·  Three areas need to be addressed:

1.  Protection of staff, national and international – procedures developed and information and/or training need to urgently be made available to both national and international staff.

2.  Operational Guidelines – including how operate if population / humanitarian supply contamination: In particular, guidance now to assist in contingency planning phase, and also identification of who will provide direction, guidance and information

3.  Technical Co-operation – supporting national capacities, civil defence / public health…

Web sites with information on NBC

·  www. who. org

·  www. opcw. org

·  www. reliefweb. int/ochunep/nbc. htm