Experimental Investigations of Social Preferences (стр. 9 )

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* Thanks to Francesco Guala, Dan Hausman, and Jiji Zhang for helpful comments and conversations.

[1] For example, if subject play is primarily to be explained in terms of adherence to social norms (see below), then it seems entirely possible that subjects may see the dictator game as governed by some norm of sharing or altruism, as when one gives money to a charity or homeless person, while the ultimatum game may be seen as governed by bargaining norms, as when one bargains over a used car, with the convention being that is entirely appropriate to drive the hardest bargain possible, with generosity or altruism playing no role. To the extent this is the right analysis, it would be wrong to simply assume that the DG measures a preference that is also present in the UG.

As Camerer, 2003 notes, one way of getting at this issue empirically is to compare offers in UGs with the offers that would maximize expected utility given the actual pattern of rejection in these games. If these are the same, this suggests that proposers are behaving in a purely strategic self-interested way (and perhaps also in accord with some norm that says this is permissible in a bargaining situation). In fact, the most recent evidence is that offers are larger than the pay-off maximizing offers, given plausible assumptions about risk aversion. This suggests that proposers are not behaving in a purely self-interested way, and exhibit some generosity and/or are influenced by some sharing norm. The general point, however, is that we need some reason to think that this is true before taking a comparison of proposer behavior in UGs and DGs to be a measure of the influence of proposer generosity in DGs.

[2] One response to the imaging experiments I have heard from some economists is that even if the above interpretation is accepted at face value, the subjects are still behaving selfishly – it is just that they are acting for the pleasure or “warm glow” they get from co-operation. Of course this argument recapitulates familiar philosophical disputes about psychological egoism: if we stipulate that whenever subjects’ reward systems are activated, they are acting “selfishly”, then since arguably all intentional or purposeful action involves such activation, all such actions will be “selfish”. One may doubt, however, whether this is a very useful stipulation, since given the empirical facts about the ubiquity of the reward system, it effectively defines unselfishness out of existence.

[3] Additional evidence for this interpretation comes from experiments conducted by. Falk, Fehr, and Fishbacher, 2003 . The authors had subjects simultaneously enter choices for each of four mini-ultimatum games (MUGs). In each game, one of the choices for the proposer is (8,2) but the other option varies from (10,0) ,(8,2), (5,5), (2,8). Unsurprisingly, Falk et al. observe that responders behavior is strongly influenced by the alternatives available to the proposers. For example, rejections are much more common when the propose chooses (8,2) when the alternative is (5,5) than when the alternatives are (10,0) or (2,8). This is exactly what one would expect if second movers detect and respond to first movers intentions, since intentions depend on alternatives that are not chosen as well as those that are chosen, with choice of 8,2 over 10,0 revealing a kinder intention than the choice of 8,2 over 5,5 . By contrast if responders care only about outcomes, they should reject the choice of an 8,2 split at a constant rate across these games.

[4] Two additional observations are relevant here. First, it is entirely possible that the degree of consistency of type itself varies across individuals. That is, it may be that some individuals exhibit considerable consistency of type or behavior across different situations and others do not. Second, other sorts of measures besides behavior in games may be useful (as part of a triangulation strategy) in detecting whether there are consistent types. For example, Smith et al (2002 ) administered a personality test designed to measure degree of “Machiavellian Intelligence” – that is, the extent to which subjects were willing to flout co-operative norms (to lie, cheat etc.) in order to secure self-interested ends -- and then had subjects play repeated trust games. There was little correlation between play in these games and test scores except for subjects with very high scores. These “high Machs” were much more likely to behave in an uncooperative way in trust games. It would be interesting to see if these same subjects were also more likely to contribute little or nothing in public goods games, defect in PDs etc. As another illustration, consider recent imaging experiments by Singer et al. (2004) on the neural basis of empathy. These researchers found that subjects who had high scores on standard empathy test questionnaires also had activation in neural areas (insula, anterior cingulate) thought to be involved in empathy in empathy related tasks. This at least suggests the possibility that there may be types of people who are more or less empathetic. It would be interesting to see whether scores on empathy questionnaires and physiological measures correlate with play in. e. g. various versions of the DG.

[5] Experimenters go to considerable lengths to make sure that subjects understand (at a conscious level) the rules of the game that they are playing, including whether it is one shot or repeated. I take it that what is being suggested is that despite their intellectual recognition that the game is one-shot, subjects may nonetheless import (as a result of unconscious processing or implicit learning) patterns of play from repeated games with which they have experience.