Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Consumer Response Measures (Means and Standard Deviations)
Dependent variables | Control group (n = 12) | Treatment 1 (n = 12) | Treatment 2 (n = 14) | |||
Mean | SD | Mean | SD | Mean | SD | |
Product attitude: Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 | 4.46 4.46 4.29 | (.29) (.34) (.33) | 4.42 4.00 3.75 | (.26) (.26) (.23) | 4.07 4.00 3.61 | (.30) (.27) (.33) |
Buying intention: Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 | 3.83 3.58 3.42 | (.28) (.32) (.36) | 4.03 4.14 3.75 | (.31) (.24) (.31) | 4.40 4.26 3.57 | (.29) (.24) (.22) |
Price unfairness: Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 | 4.28 5.11 5.19 | (.38) (.26) (.27) | 3.81 4.39 4.33 | (.39) (.37) (.41) | 4.48 4.64 4.79 | (.24) (.25) (.21) |
Pricing unfairness: Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 | - 5.25 5.25 | - (.28) (.39) | - 4.83 4.83 | - (.21) (.47) | - 4.79 5.86 | - (.37) (.27) |
Table 3. Simple Effects Analysis Using A General Linear Model (With Repeated Measures) Procedure
Dependent variables | Treatment 1 (Treatment 1 vs Control) | Treatment 2 (Treatment 2 vs Control) |
Product attitude: Interaction 2 vs Interaction 1 Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 | -.35* -.05 | .01 -.19 |
Buying intention: Interaction 2 vs Interaction 1 Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 | .55** -.17 | .34 -.47* |
Price unfairness: Interaction 2 vs Interaction 1 Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 | .26 -.01 | -.21 .19 |
Pricing unfairness: Interaction 3 vs Interaction 2 | .25 | 1.33*** |
Note. – Values in the table are the coefficients in the regressions where each dependent variable is regressed against its lagged value (i. d. the value of the same variable at the previous interaction) and binary dummy variables for between-subjects groups: Y (Interaction N) = Y (Interaction N-1) + Dummy (Treatment 1) + Dummy (Treatment 2). A dummy variable for the control group is omitted as its coefficient is reflected in the base value before the lagged variable. The constant was suppressed from all regressions.
p < .10*; p < .05**; p < .01***
The analysis reveals that the Treatment 1 group reacts less negatively to price increase than the Control group (.55**). While the Treatment 2 group rapidly shrinks their buying intentions only when they are notified of the tactic usage (-.47*).
The Treatment 1 group modifies their product attitude in a more negative direction when faced with downsizing (-.35*), and do not change their response when they get external information which confirms the usage of a tactic. The Treatment 2 group did not show a significant differences from the Control group in product attitude throughout the interactions (coefficients before the product attitude variable is insignificant in all regressions).
Price unfairness have a tendency to raise in all three groups equally from Interaction 1 to Interaction 2. There are no significant coefficients before both treatment dummy variables, which shows that treatments do not deviate from the main tendency. Secondly, there is significant leap in pricing unfairness perception in the Treatment 2 group (1.33***) as compared to the Control group, which means that consumers who do not immediately detect the product downsizing increase their pricing unfairness perceptions rapidly upon an external notification.
16.3. t-test
To test whether there are differences in the persuasion knowledge among consumer treatment groups, a simple t-test for mean difference between two independent groups was accomplished. Two-tailored t-test for two independent groups provides the following statistics: t = - 0.35, df = 24. The null hypothesis about mean equivalence is not rejected (p > .10). Thus, there are no significant differences in the persuasion knowledge between consumers who are able and unable to detect the product downsizing by themselves. So the hypothesis 7 is not supported for the current sample.
17. Conclusion
In general, the study can contribute to the existing research in several ways. Firstly, it deepens the understanding of price framing by interpreting the existing research contradictions through the introduction of consumer ability to detect a misleading tactic (i. d. product downsizing) as a moderating variable. Secondly, it links a consumer ability to detect a misleading tactic with the level of consumer persuasion knowledge.
In particular, the analysis revealed that even when consumers are able to detect the product downsizing, they tend to err in their judgments regarding the price change and underestimate the scope of price increase. That could be driven by the limited abilities to conduct valid mathematical calculations when both the nominator and denominator (that is, product size and total package price) change. Even in the absence of product downsizing, consumers did not provide a valid evaluation of price change scope, and product downsizing being a more mentally challenging way to frame a price change accelerates the tendency to make mistakes among consumers.
The study identified that consumers who do not immediately detect the product downsizing increase their pricing unfairness perceptions and decrease buying intentions rapidly upon an external notification. As the same effect is not observed for the price unfairness construct, it can be assumed that price and pricing unfairness should really be treated as separate constructs, which is propagated in some academic literature on consumer fairness judgments (Haws, Bearden, 2006).
The study did not reveal a significant difference in the level of consumer persuasion knowledge among consumers who were able and unable to detect a product downsizing. That could raise the questions on the validity of the persuasion knowledge scale used in the study and appeal to the development or adaptation of other scales which are more relevant to the purposes of the study. The possible alternative is the Pricing Tactic Persuasion Knowledge (PTPK) scale developed by Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson (2007) which tests more objective, rather than subjective persuasion knowledge in the domain of pricing by testing consumer knowledge of concrete pricing tactics used in a particular market.
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[13] В качестве показателей чувствительности спроса использованы коэффициент ценовой эластичности спроса при изменении номинальной цены за упаковку продукта E(price) и коэффициент ценовой эластичности спроса при изменении размера продукта E(size) (пример расчета коэффициентов приведен далее в тексте статьи).
[14] В таблице рассчитаны коэффициенты точечной эластичности.
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